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Abstract
Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants
to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether
such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the
European car market. We ￿rst estimate a demand model with product and spatial
di⁄erentiation, and quantify the role of a dense distribution network in explaining the
car manufacturers￿market shares. We then perform policy counterfactuals to assess
the pro￿t incentives and entry-deterring e⁄ects of exclusive dealing. We ￿nd that
there are no individual incentives to maintain exclusive dealing, but there can be a
collective incentive by the industry as a whole, even absent e¢ ciencies. Furthermore,
a ban on exclusive dealing would shift market shares from the larger European ￿rms
to the smaller entrants. More importantly, consumers would gain substantially, mainly
because of the increased spatial availability and less so because of intensi￿ed price
competition. Our ￿ndings suggest that the European Commission￿ s recent decision to
facilitate exclusive dealing in the car market may not have been warranted.
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Exclusive dealing has attracted a lot of attention from researchers and competition author-
ities alike. The early view considered exclusive dealing to be an anticompetitive barrier to
entry, since it forces new entrants to set up their own costly distribution networks. The
Chicago school (Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976) challenged this view. It stressed that the incum-
bent must pay the retailer to accept exclusivity, so that an exclusive deal does not turn out
in their joint interest in the absence of e¢ ciencies. The post-Chicago literature, in turn,
identi￿ed conditions under which an incumbent and a retailer may have a joint incentive
to contract on exclusive dealing as a way to foreclose entry. The main insight is that such
contracts imply externalities on other ￿rms not accounted for by the Chicago school.
In this paper, we contribute to the growing debate on whether exclusive dealing may act
as a barrier to entry. We ￿rst provide a framework to empirically analyze the incentives and
e⁄ects of exclusive dealing. We then apply it to the European car market, which has a long
history of industry regulations towards vertical restraints. Since its ￿rst Motor Vehicle Block
Exemption in 1985, the European Commission accepted that manufacturers could impose
exclusive dealing on their retailers. As a result, exclusive dealing has become prevalent in
most European countries, with exclusivity ranging between 70% and 90% of the car dealers.
We begin our analysis with a simple conceptual framework. We assume that incumbents
can convince their retailers to accept exclusivity, consistent with some recent post-Chicago
theories. We instead focus on the largely ignored question whether the incumbent has an in-
centive to keep out an entrant in the ￿rst place. The theoretical literature has typically taken
this for granted, by assuming that entry reduces the incumbent￿ s and entrant￿ s joint pro￿ts.
In practice, however, this is not so obvious. While entry leads to intensi￿ed competition, it
may also increase demand through two channels. First, when an individual incumbent allows
an entrant on its distribution network, this leads to business stealing from other incumbents.
As a result, no incumbent may have a unilateral incentive for exclusive dealing to deter entry.
Second, when a group of incumbents allows entry on their distribution networks, there is no
more business stealing from each other, but demand may still increase because of product
di⁄erentiation (or ￿business stealing from the outside good￿ ). Hence, incumbents may not
even have a collective incentive for exclusive dealing as a mechanism to foreclose entrants.
In sum, when entry raises total demand (because of business stealing and/or product dif-
ferentiation), entrants may be able to su¢ ciently compensate incumbents for not signing
exclusive contracts with their retailers.
This framework serves as a guide for our empirical analysis of exclusive dealing as an entry
barrier in the European car market. We collected a rich data set on car sales per model at
2the level of local towns in Belgium, and we combined this with data on dealer locations. Our
empirical analysis consists of two steps. In a ￿rst step, we estimate a rich demand model
with both product and spatial di⁄erentiation.1 The model enables us to quantify how much
consumers value brands and how much they value dealer proximity (for buying a car, but
especially for obtaining convenient after-sales services).2 We ￿nd that dealer proximity is
an important determinant of automobile demand. This gives a ￿rst indication that exclusive
dealing may serve as an entry barrier.
In a second step, we combine the demand model with a model of oligopoly pricing to
perform a counterfactual analysis of exclusive dealing. We focus on the e⁄ects of a shift
from exclusive dealing to multi-branding agreements between European incumbents and
more recent entrants. Consistent with competition policy approaches, we consider both the
internal pro￿t incentives and the external e⁄ects of such a shift.
Regarding the internal pro￿t incentives, we ￿nd that European incumbents have strong
unilateral incentives to shift to multi-branding with recent entrants. This enables them to
steal business from other competitors. At the same time, however, incumbents have no col-
lective incentive to shift to multi-branding with entrants. Although this creates a small
amount of market expansion (business stealing from the outside good), this is outweighted
by losses from intensi￿ed competition. In sum, there are no unilateral but possibly collective
incentives to maintain exclusive dealing, even absent e¢ ciencies. These ￿ndings may ratio-
nalize the industry￿ s e⁄orts to organize exclusive dealing under an industry block exemption
regulation, as this provides a collective incentive infrastructure for all incumbent ￿rms.
Regarding the external e⁄ects, we ￿nd that a collective shift to multi-branding would raise
the entrants￿market share from 27% to 32%, at the expense of European incumbents. More
importantly, consumers would gain substantially from the removal of exclusive contracts,
namely e867 per household, a sizeable fraction of the average price of a sold car. These
consumer gains are for 90% due to increased spatial availability and only for 10% due to
lower prices. Finally, total welfare also increases, by an amount similar to the consumer gains.
Overall, these results imply that the current distribution system, where ￿rms collectively
maintain exclusive dealing, does not necessarily have an immediate e¢ ciency rationale and
1To incorporate product di⁄erentiation, we follow Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001), and adopt a
random coe¢ cients logit model, accounting for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity for the valuation
of product characteristics. Furthermore, we add spatial di⁄erentiation as in Davis (2006) and Ishii (2008).
For the car market in the San Diego area, Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010) also introduced both product
and spatial di⁄erentiation, but in a simpler nested logit framework.
2There is still a strong link with sales services in Europe. A survey conducted by Lademann and Partner
(2001) found that ￿The high value placed on after-sales servicing [...] shows that, when a new car is being
purchased, the buying phase is already overshadowed by the expectations placed on the utilisation phase.
Therefore after-sales servicing is already of utmost importance at the time of purchase.￿Shortly after the
purchase, brand loyalty is about 90%.
3can imply large losses to consumers and welfare. These ￿ndings suggest that the European
Commission￿ s recent decision to facilitate exclusive dealing in the car market may not have
been warranted.
There is a large theoretical literature on exclusive dealing. Most of this work has focused
on the challenge raised by the Chicago school that an incumbent is not able to pay a su¢ -
cient amount to the retailer to accept exclusivity, unless there are e¢ ciencies. One example
of such a post-Chicago theory is the theory of Aghion and Bolton (1987). They show that
an incumbent and a retailer can at least partially exclude an e¢ cient entrant if the contract
includes liquidated damages (serving as an entry cost for the entrant). Another theory of
exclusive dealing starts from the assumption that an entrant needs more than one retailer
to cover its ￿xed entry costs (Rasmusen et al., 1991; Segal and Whinston, 2000). Although
retailers would prefer upstream competition, no single retailer has an incentive to refuse an
exclusive dealing contract when all other retailers sign. The incumbent can take advantage
of the retailers￿coordination failure and cheaply exclude the entrant from the market. More
recent work has shown that the circumstances under which an incumbent can exploit the
retailers￿coordination failure are surprisingly subtle.3 Our paper simply assumes that in-
cumbents can convince retailers to sign an exclusive dealing contract. We instead focus on
the possibility that an entrant can convince an incumbent not to sign an exclusive dealing
contract and allow entry on its distribution network. This provides interesting insights and
suggests that more theoretical work could focus in this direction.
Despite the variety of theories, empirical evidence on exclusive dealing remains very
scarce, especially on the entry deterring motive. A small experimental literature has studied
the role of speci￿c game-theoretic assumptions behind exclusive dealing as an entry barrier.
Consistent with the theory, these studies con￿rm that the outcome depends crucially on the
set-up of the game, including communication and discrimination (Landeo and Spier, 2009),
sequentiality and secrecy (Boone et al., 2009) and the number of buyers (Smith, 2010).
Empirical evidence outside of the laboratory is even scarcer. Since directly estimating
the e⁄ect of exclusive dealing on entry is very di¢ cult, all previous empirical studies have
used an indirect approach. Sass (2005) ￿nds that exclusive dealing is more prevalent in
smaller markets, while foreclosure theory suggests they opposite. Similarly, Asker (2004)
￿nds that rivals do not have higher costs when they must compete with ￿rms who sell under
exclusive dealing agreements. This also goes against the raising-rivals￿ -cost prediction of
3Fumagalli and Motta (2006) show that the coordination problem may disappear when the retailers are
not ￿nal consumers, but instead compete with each other. One single deviant retailer may then be able to
serve the whole market by buying more cheaply from the entrant, enabling the entrant to cover its ￿xed costs.
However, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) reverse the results when there is contract breach. The incumbent
is then able to prevent entry when retailers compete, but not when they are ￿nal consumers.
4foreclosure. One study suggests exclusive dealing contracts may be used to foreclose. Ater
(2010) ￿nds that exclusive dealing reduces sales, and concludes that this is inconsistent with
e¢ ciencies, so that exclusive dealing must be used for anti-competitive reasons. We take
this literature a step further. By estimating a rich demand model with both product and
spatial di⁄erentiation, we can ￿rst assess the anti-competitive pro￿t incentives for exclusive
dealing, and subsequently evaluate the impact on consumers and welfare.
Our work does not only contribute to the academic literature, but also to the policy
debate on vertical restraints, competition policy and non-tari⁄trade barriers. Policy makers
in both the U.S. and in Europe have repeatedly expressed concerns that the reduction of
government-imposed trade barriers (such as tari⁄s) may induce private companies to set up
anti-competitive practices as a protection against foreign manufacturers.4 In this respect,
our ￿ndings suggest that exclusive dealing in the European car market has only served as
a mild entry barrier against Asian competitors, but with large consequences on consumers￿
domestic welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant regu-
lations in the European car market. Section 3 provides a conceptual framework for thinking
of the internal pro￿t incentives for exclusive dealing. Section 4 develops the model of demand
and pricing, and the counterfactuals to assess the e⁄ects of a shift from exclusive dealing
to multi-branding. Section 5 describes the data and estimation issues and section 6 shows
the empirical results and counterfactual analyses. Finally, section 7 provides extensions and
sensitivity analysis: we consider the role of substitution to the outside good, and we allow for
the possibility that a shift to multi-branding induces ￿rms to coordinate pricing decisions,
as in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Rey and VergØ (2010). Section 8 concludes.
2 Vertical restraints in the European car market
Car manufacturers have exercised control on their dealership networks through a wide range
of vertical restraints. We ￿rst give a broad overview of the most relevant price and non-
price restraints in the European car market. We then discuss the evolution in the European
Commission￿ s policy towards the three main non-price restraints, with a focus on exclusive
4For example, the following quote comes from two former European Commissioners for trade and com-
petition policy: ￿[...] the incentive for ￿rms to engage in anti-competitive behavior impeding market access
(such as [...] vertical restraints) increases with the reduction of tari⁄s and other barriers￿ , see Brittan and
Van Miert (1996). Similarly, the U.S. Federal trade Commission￿ s Assistant Director of the International
Antitrust Division has stated that: ￿[...] as government barriers to market integration disappear, we can
expect that private anticompetitive practices will assume increased importance. And vertical restrictions will
be an important and complicated issue for competition enforcers￿ , see Valentine (1997).
5dealing. Finally, we present preliminary evidence on exclusive dealing and its relationship
with market shares.
Price and non-price restraints European car manufacturers apply several types of price
restraints. First, they apply non-linear wholesale pricing policies in the form of bonuses to
their dealers if they meet certain sales targets. Second, they publish recommended retail
prices (or list prices) to their dealers and advertise these to consumers through price cata-
logues. Recommended retail prices are evidently not equivalent to resale price maintenance
(RPM), since car dealers can still apply discounts to the recommended retail prices. In
practice, however, the distinction between both is often very small.5 Based on both consider-
ations, we will assume throughout the paper that manufacturers control retail prices either
directly or indirectly, so there are no double marginalization e⁄ects.
In addition to these price restraints, manufacturers apply three main non-price restraints:
selective distribution, exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing. Selective distribution
enables manufacturers to impose various quantitative and qualitative criteria on their dealers,
such as a maximum number of dealers through the country, and minimum standards on
showrooms, sta⁄ training and advertising. Exclusive distribution (or exclusive territories)
allows manufacturers to appoint a designated territory to each dealer. Finally, exclusive
dealing (or single-branding) restricts the dealer to sell competing brands, or only allows a
maximum number of sales of competing brands. This third vertical agreement is the focus
of our paper.
Evolution in policy towards non-price restraints Before 1985 vertical restraints were
allowed as individual exemptions under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. This was a costly
process, and the arguments motivating the exemptions were typically the same across cases.
Since 1985, the European Commission has therefore followed a policy of granting block ex-
emptions applicable to the whole car sector. This eliminated the need to ￿le for individual
exemptions, and automatically allowed manufacturers to impose the vertical restraints as
long as they remained within the ￿safe harbor￿market share thresholds of the block exemp-
tion.
Table 1 summarizes the three main episodes of block exemptions. In 1985 the Com-
mission introduced its ￿rst Motor Vehicle Block Exemption, renewed in 1992 with minor
changes. It allowed manufacturers to apply both selective and exclusive distribution, and
5Discounts to recommended retail prices tend to be quite uniform and show little variation over time,
as discussed in Degryse and Verboven (2001) based on a survey conducted through the European Commis-
sion. Furthermore, several manufacturers such as Volkswagen and DaimlerChrysler have been convicted for
imposing RPM, as reviewed in Verboven (2008).
6impose exclusive dealing up to 80% of the dealers￿sales. In practice, the distribution system
was rather rigid and led to a standardized system in which all ￿rms essentially adopted the
same vertical restraints. In 2002 a major reform took place, which became stricter towards
manufacturers while at the same time promoting more diversity in the distribution agree-
ments across ￿rms. Manufacturers could adopt either selective or exclusive distribution, but
no longer both at the same time. Exclusive dealing was still allowed, but only up to 30%
of the dealers￿sales (compared with 80% before). So in principle, between 2002 and 2010,
European dealers could sell up to three di⁄erent brands, each brand asking for exclusive
dealing up to 30% of the dealers￿sales. The Motor Vehicle Block Exemption was at that
time considerably more strict than the General Vertical Block Exemption that applied to
other industries. In June 2010 the Commission again revised the regulation. It deemed that
the level of competition was su¢ cient in the market of new car distribution, so it scaled
the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption back towards the levels of the General Vertical Block
Exemption. In June 2013 the car sector should completely fall under the general block ex-
emption rules towards vertical restraints. In particular, this means that manufacturers can
again impose exclusive dealing up to 80% of the dealers￿sales.6
This brief history of block exemptions shows an interesting evolution in the European
Commission￿ s thinking about vertical restraints. Until 2002, the Commission was largely pre-
occupied with its objective of the realization of a common market. It feared that a system of
selective and exclusive distribution would give manufacturers too much control over new car
sales, and would prevent parallel imports between European countries when international
price di⁄erences become large. The Commission therefore took several initiatives to promote
parallel imports and it periodically monitored the evolution of international price di⁄erences.
Our own and other research has documented how selective and exclusive distribution can
in￿ uence international price di⁄erentials and European integration in general (Goldberg and
Verboven, 2001; Brenkers and Verboven, 2006).
Since 2002 the Commission has clearly shifted its focus to the competition policy ob-
jective, perhaps because it considers that the common market objective has made su¢ cient
progress. First, it has taken measures to loosen the link between the car manufacturers￿
sales and after-sales networks, to reduce the risk of foreclosure of independent spare part
manufacturers. Second, it showed concern with the practice of exclusive dealing, since it
entails the risk of foreclosure of new entrants. The latter motivates our analysis of exclusive
dealing as an entry barrier.
6The 2010 regulation only became more strict towards manufacturers with respect to after-sales repair
and maintenance services, since the Commission considered competition to be less intense in these markets.
7Table 1: History of the European Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation
selective distribution exclusive distribution exclusive dealing
1985-2002 AND AND up to 80%
2002-2010 OR OR up to 30%
2010-2013 OR OR up to 80%
Note: The table reports the regulation regarding selective and exclusive distribution and
exclusive dealing throughout the three major reforms of the European Motor Vehicle Block
Exemption Regulation.
Exclusive dealing in practice Even though multi-brand dealerships were actively en-
couraged between 2002 and 2010, exclusive dealing still remained prevalent in most European
countries. The European Commission acknowledged this as well in their press release accom-
panying the new block exemption on May 27th 2010, where they state: ￿The old rules have
had little impact on favouring multi-dealerships [...].￿(DG competition, 2010). While in the
U.S. only 57% of the dealers are exclusive to one brand, this amounts to 70% in Europe
(Wade, 2005).
Our empirical application considers the case of Belgium, for which we were able to con-
struct a rich data set. This application is interesting for several reasons. First, because of its
highly urbanized structure exclusive dealing is even more prevalent in Belgium than in other
countries, with 95% of the dealers selling one single brand. Second, the Belgian car market
is the largest among countries that do not have a domestic producer.7 This leads to a fairly
unconcentrated market share with a strong market presence of most main European man-
ufacturers. As we discuss below, this makes it particularly relevant to distinguish between
unilateral exclusive dealing incentives (by a single incumbent) and collective incentives (by
multiple incumbents).
Figure 1 presents preliminary evidence on the relationship between market shares and
the number of dealers for the 38 di⁄erent brands. This is based on our detailed data set,
which we describe in more detail in section 5) Figure 1 shows there is a strong correlation
between market shares and the number of dealers (86%). While this suggests the importance
of large distribution networks, it does not imply a causal relationship since manufacturers of
intrinsically more popular brands may also open more dealerships. To address this in more
detail, we will estimate a spatial demand model at the level of the zip code, and control for
brand ￿xed e⁄ects. This model will con￿rm the importance of dealer proximity, and serve
7The market is evidently smaller than that of the six large European countries with domestic producers
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.). But it is larger than more populated countries such as the
Netherlands (high taxes) or Poland (lower income/capita).
8Figure 1: Market shares and the size of the distribution network
Note: The ￿gure plots the market shares and the number of dealers of each of the 33 brands in
our data set.
as the basis for assessing the incentives and e⁄ects of exclusive dealing.
3 Pro￿t incentives for exclusive dealing
We begin with a simple framework to discuss the incumbent ￿rms￿pro￿t incentives to engage
in either exclusive dealing or multi-branding. Previous theoretical research has focused on
the question whether an incumbent ￿rm can compensate its retailers su¢ ciently to make
them sign an exclusive contract and keep an entrant out of the market.8 Here, we simply
assume the incumbent can indeed induce its retailers to sign. For example, this may work
by exploiting a lack of coordination between retailers (as in Rasmusen et al. (1991)), or even
more simply by granting territorial exclusivity to the dealer in exchange for accepting to sell
only one brand.
Instead of the question whether the retailer can be induced to sign an exclusive dealing
contract, we focus on the equally important question whether the incumbent has an incentive
to keep out the entrant the ￿rst place. The theoretical literature has typically taken this
for granted. In practice, however, this is not so obvious since the entrant may want to
8Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) provide models where
the incumbent and the retailer have a joint interest to sign exclusivity. The debate is not settled, as evident
from the recent extensions when there is downstream competition, analyzed by Fumagalli and Motta (2006)
and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007).
9compensate the incumbent for not signing an exclusive contract with its retailers.
We ￿rst consider the case of one incumbent and one entrant. This introduces the basic
incentives for exclusive dealing. Next, we consider the case of two incumbents and one
entrant. This enables us to distinguish between the unilateral and the collective incentives
for exclusive dealing by multiple incumbents.
3.1 One incumbent, one entrant
Consider a market with one incumbent ￿rm I and one potential entrant E. Assume that I
sells through its own (vertically integrated) downstream retailer, and E can only enter if it
also obtains access to I￿ s retailer. We ask whether I has an incentive to use exclusive dealing
to foreclose E, or whether instead E can convince I not to use exclusive dealing.
If I imposes exclusive dealing, it forecloses entry by E and obtains the monopoly pro￿ts
￿M
I , and E obtains zero. If instead I allows multi-branding, then I and E obtain the duopoly
pro￿ts ￿D
I and ￿D
E. To achieve multi-branding, E is willing to compensate I by an amount up
to ￿D
E. At the same time, I requires a minimum compensation equal to its loss when going
from monopoly to duopoly, ￿M
I ￿￿D
I . Hence, the entrant cannot convince the incumbent to
accept multi-branding if and only if ￿D
E < ￿M
I ￿ ￿D








i.e. industry pro￿ts are smaller under duopoly than under monopoly. This is the typical
assumption in the literature and it is satis￿ed when the incumbent and the entrant sell
homogeneous products and are equally e¢ cient. In practice, however, industry pro￿ts may
be higher under duopoly, for example if the entrant is more e¢ cient or if it adds su¢ cient
product di⁄erentiation to the market. Under these circumstances, E can convince I not to
sign an exclusive dealing contract with its dealer and instead would accept a multi-branding
arrangement with E.
3.2 Two incumbents, one entrant
Now consider a market with two incumbent ￿rms I and U and one potential entrant E. Both
I and U sell through their own downstream retailer, and E can only enter if it obtains access
to either I￿ s or U￿ s retailer (and E is indi⁄erent between obtaining access through either
retailer). We now distinguish between the incumbents￿unilateral and collective incentives
to use exclusive dealing to foreclose entry.
If both incumbents I and U impose exclusive dealing, they foreclose entry and can obtain
10duopoly pro￿ts of ￿D
I and ￿D
U, respectively, whereas E obtains zero. If instead either I
or U allows multi-branding with E, then E becomes a viable competitor and I, U and
E obtain the triopoly pro￿ts ￿T
I , ￿T
U and ￿T
E. To achieve multi-branding, the entrant is
willing to compensate one of the incumbents by an amount up to ￿T
E. Incumbent I requires
a compensation for going to triopoly of at least ￿D
I ￿ ￿T
I , and incumbent U requires a
compensation of at least ￿D
U ￿ ￿T
U. The outcome depends on whether the incumbents can
make a collective or only a unilateral exclusive dealing agreement.
Collective exclusive dealing agreements If the incumbents can make a collective agree-
ment, the entrant must pay the minimum required compensation to both incumbents, i.e.




U. Since E is willing to pay at most ￿T
E, the

















The incumbents thus have a collective incentive to foreclose entry through exclusive dealing
if industry pro￿ts are greater under duopoly than under triopoly. In practice, this will be the
case if the entrant is not substantially more e¢ cient or if it does not add su¢ cient product
di⁄erentiation, i.e. if there is limited ￿business stealing￿from the outside good.
Unilateral exclusive dealing agreements In contrast, if the incumbents cannot make
a collective exclusive dealing agreement, the entrant must only convince either I or U to








. Since E is willing to
pay at most ￿T
























The incumbents thus have a unilateral incentive to foreclose entry through exclusive dealing
if each incumbent￿ s duopoly pro￿ts is greater is greater than the sum of each incumbent￿ s
and the entrant￿ s triopoly pro￿ts. The unilateral incentives for exclusive dealing are clearly
smaller than the collective incentives. In both cases, the incumbents are concerned that multi-
branding creates a third competitor. But with unilateral agreements, the incumbents take
into account that they can steal potentially substantial business from the other incumbent.
With a collective exclusive dealing agreement, there is no business stealing from each other,
only from the ￿outside good￿ .
11To summarize, depending on the incumbents￿and the entrant￿ s payo⁄s under duopoly
and triopoly, we have the following possibilities:
(i) no unilateral, nor collective incentives for exclusive dealing if the entrant can com-













(ii) no unilateral, but collective incentives for exclusive dealing if the entrant can com-
























(iii) both unilateral and collective incentives for exclusive dealing if the entrant cannot
















Our empirical framework will consider a much richer set-up to account for the particu-
lar characteristics of the car market. There may be both brand di⁄erentiation and spatial
di⁄erentiation between competitors, and ￿entrants￿may already be in the market but with
only a limited spatial presence. The basic economic intuition behind the pro￿t incentives
remains however the same. On the one hand, incumbents have an incentive to engage in
exclusive dealing to soften competition and limit the spatial presence of small ￿rms. On the
other hand, incumbents may be tempted to accept multi-branding, especially unilaterally,
since this enables them to steal business from competitors or from the ￿outside good￿ .
4 The model
Keeping in mind the stylized example of the previous section, we now present a rich equi-
librium model of the demand and supply of new cars. First, the demand side incorporates
both product and spatial di⁄erentiation. We formulate a random coe¢ cients logit model, in
which consumers value both car characteristics and dealer proximity. Second, the supply
side considers multi-product price-setting manufacturers. Each manufacturer has a network
of exclusive dealers and determines prices to maximize pro￿ts. Finally, we discuss how a
change from exclusive dealing to multi-branding may a⁄ect equilibrium pro￿ts, consumer
surplus and welfare.
124.1 Demand
We observe a number of local markets (towns) t = 1;:::;T, each with i = 1;:::;It consumers,
so the total number of consumers across local markets is M =
PT
t=1 It. The indirect utility
of a consumer i in market t from buying a car model j = 1;:::;J is given by
uijt = xj￿i + ￿ipj + ￿idijt + ￿j + ￿ijt (1)
= Vijt + ￿ijt:
Here, xj is a 1 ￿ K vector of observable car characteristics, pj is the price of product j, dijt
is the geographic distance between consumer i and the nearest dealer of model j, and ￿j
is an unobserved product characteristic (unobserved to the researcher). The parameters ￿i
(a K ￿ 1 vector), ￿i and ￿i are random coe¢ cients, capturing individual-speci￿c tastes for
the car characteristics, price, and distance to the nearest dealer. They are thus of central
importance to describe the extent of product di⁄erentiation and spatial di⁄erentiation in
the car market. With the exception of Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010), most other
empirical work on car demand has focused on product di⁄erentiation and neglected spatial
di⁄erentiation and the role of dealer proximity (￿i = 0). For our purposes, the role of dealer
proximity is particularly relevant, since we will assess the e⁄ects of a move from exclusive
dealing to multi-branding by changing the distances that consumers need to travel to obtain
certain products. Finally, ￿ijt is an individual-speci￿c taste parameter for product j, modeled
as a zero mean i.i.d. random variable with a Type 1 extreme-value distribution (the logit
error term).
The individual-speci￿c taste parameters ￿i, ￿i and ￿i may vary across consumers because
of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Following Nevo (2001), we specify the


















A + ￿Di + ￿￿i;
where Di is an H ￿1 vector of observed demographic variables taken from the empirical dis-
tribution, and ￿i is a (K+2)￿1 vector of unobserved standard normal consumer valuations,
￿i ￿ N(0;IK+2), independent from the distribution of Di. The parameter vector (￿;￿;￿)0 is
a (K + 2) ￿ 1 vector, capturing the mean valuations for the product characteristics, ￿ is a
(K + 2) ￿ H matrix describing how the valuations for the product characteristics vary with
consumer demographics, and ￿ is a (K +2)￿ (K +2) scaling matrix capturing unobserved
13heterogeneity in the valuations for the product characteristics. To reduce the number of
parameters to be estimated, we restrict several parameters in the matrix ￿ to zero and we
assume that ￿ is diagonal, i.e. set the covariances in ￿ to zero.
Instead of purchasing one of the car models j, consumers may also decide not to purchase
a car, in which case they consume the ￿outside good￿ . We specify ui0t = ￿i0t, i.e. we normalize
the mean and individual-speci￿c valuations to zero, since they are not identi￿ed from the
constant terms.
Assuming that consumers choose the car model that maximizes utility, the probability








To obtain the unconditional probability or aggregate market share of car model j in market




where f(￿;D) is the joint density function of ￿ and D the demographic variable vector and
the random draws.
We can now derive total demand for each model j across all local markets t = 1;:::;T. It
is useful to express demand as a function of car prices and the geographic dealer network. Let
p be the J￿1 price vector, with elements pj. Furthermore, let d be a J￿M distance matrix,
with elements dijt. The distance matrix d thus describes the distances that all consumers
need to travel to the nearest dealer of each product j. Rewriting Prjt as Prjt(p;d), we can




Hence, total demand for each model j is a function of the price vector p and the distance
matrix d. As we discuss in the next subsection 4.2, prices are determined according to multi-
product Bertrand pricing. Furthermore, as we discuss in subsection 4.3, the distance matrix
is taken as given, but we will consider counterfactuals where the distance matrix changes
when ￿rms would open up their exclusive distribution networks.
144.2 Oligopoly pricing
As discussed in section 2, car manufacturers may in￿ uence retail prices in various ways,
by setting wholesale prices, franchise fees, sales targets and dealer bonuses, etc. Based
on this, we follow a simpli￿ed approach and assume each manufacturer sets retail prices
to maximize total upstream and downstream pro￿ts over all its products, taking as given
the retail prices set by the other ￿rms. This is the multi-product pricing Bertrand pricing
assumption, common in much of the car market literature. It is as if manufacturers and
dealers implement the vertically integrated solution. As shown by Rey and VergØ (2010),
this equilibrium may also result from ￿interlocking relationships￿ between manufacturers
and dealers when ￿rms using non-linear pricing schemes. Bonnet and Dubois (2010) obtain
recent empirical evidence consistent with this assumption.9
More formally, we observe F car manufacturers, each producing a subset Ff of the J
di⁄erent car models and selling it through the existing dealer network d. Manufacturer f￿ s




(pj ￿ cj)qj(p;d); (4)
where cj is the constant marginal cost of producing and selling product j. Each manufacturer
sets the prices of all its products to maximize pro￿ts, taking as given the prices set by the








= 0; for all j = 1;:::;J: (5)
We write the Nash equilibrium solution to this system as p = p￿(d).
To write the ￿rst-order conditions in matrix form, de￿ne ￿
F as the manufacturers￿product
ownership matrix, where a typical element ￿
F
jk is equal to 1 if products j and k are produced
by the same manufacturer, and 0 otherwise. Let q(p) be the J ￿1 market share vector, and
5ps(p(d);d) ￿
@q(p(d);d)
@p0 be the corresponding J ￿ J Jacobian matrix of ￿rst derivatives.
Using the operator ￿ to denote the Hadamar product, or element-by-element multiplication,
9Bonnet and Dubois (2010) consider a various possible equilibria based on Rey and VergØ (2010) model of
vertical interlocking relationships. See also Villas-Boas (2007) for an analysis of alternative models of vertical
relations. On the European car market, Brenkers and Verboven (2006) ￿nd that a linear wholesale pricing
model with double marginalization is not plausible.








(p ￿ c) = 0: (6)
As is well-known, one can use the ￿rst-order conditions (6) to retrieve the current marginal
costs b c as the di⁄erence between the current prices and the equilibrium pro￿t margins










One can subsequently use the uncovered marginal costs to perform policy counterfactuals on
(6), i.e. consider the e⁄ects of exogenous changes on equilibrium prices, pro￿ts and welfare.
We now describe the type of counterfactuals we conduct.
4.3 From exclusive dealing to multi-branding
Our main goal is to assess the pro￿t incentives and the welfare e⁄ects of a move from exclu-
sive dealing to multi-branding. Such a move essentially consists of a change in the spatial
availability of the products that become available at multi-brand dealerships. More formally,
we de￿ne a move from exclusive dealing to multi-branding as a change in the distance ma-
trix d (which consists of the nearest distances of all consumers to all products). De￿ne the
current system of exclusive dealing by the distance matrix d0 and a new distribution system
with multi-branding arrangements by a new distance matrix d1.
To illustrate, consider Figure 4.3, showing the location of a single consumer i and three
single-product ￿rms I, U and E, who initially apply exclusive dealing. Think of I and U as
large incumbents, located close to consumer i, and E as a small entrant, located at a high
distance. Suppose that the large ￿rm I opens up its dealer network to the small entrant E,
but not vice versa, and the other large ￿rm U remains outside the agreement. Figure 4.3
shows how consumer i￿ s travel distance to E would change, while its travel distances to I
and U would stay the same. Multi-branding, as we consider it, is then a shift from the 3￿1
distance matrix d0 = fd0
iI;d0
iU;d0




More generally, a move from exclusive dealing (d0) to multi-branding (d1) thus involves a
change of the travel distances for all consumers whose nearest dealer of a particular product
has changed. This increased spatial availability has both direct e⁄ects and indirect e⁄ects
through the change in the Nash equilibrium price vector p￿(d). We consider the e⁄ects on


















Figure 2: Entrant E makes use of incumbent I.s dealerships under multibranding
Note: The ￿gure illustrates a move from exclusive dealing to multibranding. The panel on the
left shows the situation under exclusive dealing, when I, E and U each have their own dealer. The




panel on the right shows the situation under multibranding, when E can sell its goods at I￿ s dealer.



























































= ￿qjp0 + ￿qjd1:
The second and third equalities decompose the total demand e⁄ect into a direct demand
e⁄ect ￿qjp0 (holding prices at current equilibrium) and an indirect demand e⁄ect (allowing
for a new Nash equilibrium).
Consider our example where I opens up its network to E, but not vice versa. The direct
e⁄ect is to reduce the demand for I and increase the demand for E (and also reduce the
demand for U). The indirect demand e⁄ect stems from intensi￿ed competition and a decrease
in prices (because of reduced spatial di⁄erentiation). The total demand e⁄ect of a shift to
multi-branding is therefore ambiguous, though it appears reasonable to expect that the direct
e⁄ect dominates, hence a net reduction in the demand for I and a net increase in the demand
for E.
Pro￿t incentives Consider for simplicity single-product ￿rms. In our empirical analysis,
we will take into account that ￿rms are multi-product ￿rms. The e⁄ects of multi-branding










































































This decomposes the total pro￿t e⁄ect into a competition e⁄ect and a (total) demand e⁄ect.
In our example where I opens its network to E, the joint pro￿t e⁄ect of multi-branding
for I and E is


















￿qE | {z }
demand e⁄ect
:
To obtain economic intuition on the signs of these e⁄ects, consider a symmetric situation,
where I and E have identical marginal costs (cI = cE) and set identical prices in equilibrium
(pk
I = pk
E, k = 0;1), but do not necessarily obtain the same demands. We then obtain




















Regarding the competition e⁄ect, one may expect that prices go down because of the
decreased spatial di⁄erentiation between ￿rms I and E when I allows E on its network.
This is especially the case if consumers are very sensitive regarding distance (weak spatial
di⁄erentiation) and/or if consumers perceive I and E as close substitutes products (weak
brand di⁄erentiation).
Regarding the demand e⁄ect, one may typically expect that ￿qI < 0, ￿qE > 0 and
￿qI + ￿qE > 0: when I opens it network to E, there is a shift in demand from I to E, but
the joint demand of I and E may be expected to increase (at the expense of U). Only in
the extreme case where the joint demand for I and E is perfectly inelastic with respect to
distance, the joint demand for I and E remains una⁄ected.
The overall pro￿t e⁄ect of a shift from exclusive dealing to multi-branding is therefore
ambiguous. The standard anti-competitive pro￿t incentive for exclusive dealing only holds
if the competition e⁄ect dominates the demand e⁄ect.
18Welfare e⁄ects Following Williams (1977) and Small and Rosen (1981), in the logit model















Write CS explicitly as a function of p and d, i.e. CS(p;d), to decompose the e⁄ects of

































= ￿CSjp0 + ￿CSjd1
The ￿rst part is the increased consumer surplus because of increased availability, the second
part is the change in consumer surplus because of the implied change in prices.






after substituting (4). Similar to consumer surplus, the e⁄ects of multi-branding on producer

































= ￿PSjp0 + ￿PSjd1;
i.e. a pro￿t e⁄ect because of increased availability, and a pro￿t e⁄ect because of the change
in competition. Finally, we can compute the e⁄ects of multi-branding on total welfare, the
sum of consumer and producer surplus.
5 Data and estimation
We ￿rst discuss how we construct our data set from a combination of various sources. We then
describe how we use the data set to estimate our spatial demand model with di⁄erentiated
19products.
5.1 Data
Our data set covers the car market in Belgium at a highly disaggregate level. After the ￿ve
large countries France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K., Belgium is the sixth largest car
market in the European Union (larger than the more populated but high car tax country the
Netherlands, and larger than the low income countries Poland and Romania). In contrast
with the ￿ve large countries, there are no domestic brands. This results in a relatively
unconcentrated market structure with many European incumbents of similar size.
We combine the following data sets. The main data set consists of car sales by model,
zip code and sex. We combine this with three auxiliary data sets: dealer locations and dealer
characteristics; car characteristics by model; and household characteristics by statistical
sector within each zip code.
Car sales data The data on car sales come from Febiac, the Belgian automobile federation.
The data cover car sales during the year 2004 for each model, by zip code and purchaser
type. The zip code is the postal code, which refers to a town or a group of at most 2￿ 3 towns.
The purchaser type may be one of three groups (in addition to a negligible rest category):
men, women and corporations. Since corporations often buy their ￿ eet centrally and have
di⁄erent relationships with the car dealers, we exclude car sales to private companies. We
thus end up with car sales data per model, broken down by zip code and sex.
Dealer data The dealer data were assembled by Arvato Spectron in 2005. They consist
of 3,329 dealer observations with information on their address and brands sold. We use this
information to assign the dealers￿geographic (x;y) coordinates and compute the distances
between consumers and the nearest dealer per brand.
Car characteristics The data on car characteristics come from JATO. We have data
by model and by variant on several product characteristics, including: price, horsepower,
maximum speed, acceleration, fuel consumption, length, width, and availability of standard
or optional equipment (airbag, climate control, ABS, etc.) Since many of these variables are
correlated, we only include four: price, horsepower, length and fuel consumption. Price is the
list price, and therefore uniform across markets, just as the other car characteristics. We do
not observe dealer discounts, but the evidence (discussed in section 2) suggests that discounts
tend to be relatively uniform across consumers, vary little over time, and mainly di⁄er by
20brand (for which we control using ￿xed e⁄ects) or for corporations (which we exclude from
our analysis).
While the characteristics data are available at the model and variant level, we only observe
sales at the model level. We therefore construct a baseline version of each model. This is the
lowest priced variant, excluding the 25% lowest selling models.
Consumer demographics Finally, we observe consumer demographics by statistical sec-
tor within each zip code, obtained from ADSEI (Belgian institute of statistics). This infor-
mation includes personal income, household size, age of head of household, and degree of
urbanization. One may expect that the distribution of these consumer demographics a⁄ects
car sales, observed at the zip code level. We therefore match the information on consumer
demographics to car sales at the zip code level, following Nevo (2001), as discussed in the
previous section. Since we observe car sales by sex, this procedure is not needed for this
consumer characteristic.
Summary statistics Table 2 summarizes the variables in our data set. The top panel
shows summary statistics on car sales. We observe sales of 225 models, in 1,139 zip codes
and for 2 consumer types (men and women), amounting to a total of 512,550 observations.
Since the data is at such a disaggregate level, there are many models/zip codes/consumer
types with zero sales. In fact, average sales per model/zip code/consumer type are equal to
0.5, and the median of sales is zero. Average sales are much higher for European incumbents
(1.3) than for other ￿rms (Asian and smaller niche producers, 0.2).
The second panel summarizes information on the calculated travel distances for con-
sumers to the nearest dealer of each brand. The average travel distance is 12.1 km. This
seems fairly large, but it follows from the fact that there are many brands with few dealers
across the country. Indeed, the average travel distance to dealers of incumbent brands is only
5.7 km, while the average travel distance to other brands is 14 km. For example, consumers
need to travel on average 3 km to the nearest Renault or Citroºn dealer, and on average 20
km to a Subaru dealer.
The third panel shows summary statistics on the included model characteristics. The
average car has a price equal to 0.9 times GDP/capita, but varies from 0.4 for the 10% quar-
tile to 1.5 for the 90% quartile. The other car characteristics, horsepower, fuel consumption
and length show similar variation across models.
Finally, the bottom panel summarizes the information on consumer demographics, by
zip code. The average zip code (town) has 9,100 inhabitants, about half of which are men.
Average GDP/capita is around e25,000, and the average household contains 2.5 members.
21Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10%. Median 90% # Obs.
Car sales
Sales - all brands 0.5 1.8 0 0 1 512,550
Sales - incumbents 1.3 3.4 0 0 4 113900
Sales - others 0.2 0.9 0 0 1 398650
Dealer distance
Distance (km) - all brands 12.1 14.0 2.3 8.2 25.0 512,550
Distance (km) - incumbents 5.7 4.6 1.3 4.7 11 113,900
Distance (km) - others 14 15.1 2.8 9.7 28.5 398,650
Model characteristics
Price (/GDP per cap) 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.5 225
Horsepower (in kW) 87.9 37.9 47.0 80.0 128.0 225
Fuel consumption (liter/km) 7.0 2.0 4.8 6.5 9.7 225
Length (in cm) 428.4 45.4 366.6 435.0 481.0 225
Market demographics
Population(103) 9.1 12.0 0.7 5.4 21.8 1,139
Men(103) 4.5 5.9 0.3 2.7 10.6 1,139
Women(103) 4.7 6.2 0.3 2.7 11.3 1,139
Mean income(103) 25.0 4.1 20.0 24.6 30.4 1,139
Household size 2.5 0.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 1,139
Urbanization 5.5 3.3 2.0 5.0 11.0 1,139
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations of the main variables, as well as the 10h,
50th and 90th percentiles. The total number of observations is 512,550: 225 models x 1,139 zip
codes x 2 consumer types (men and women), covering Belgium in 2004.
5.2 Estimation
We now discuss how we estimate the demand model with product and spatial di⁄erentiation.
The estimated demand parameters are subsequently used to uncover markups and marginal
costs, based on our equilibrium pricing model. This, in turn, enables us to conduct our
counterfactuals on the incentives and e⁄ects of exclusive dealing agreements.
Maximum likelihood estimation We estimate the demand parameters using simulated
maximum likelihood. In section 4, we ￿rst derived the conditional choice probability of
individual i in market t for choosing model model j, i.e. Pr ijt(Di;￿i), as given by (2). We
integrated this over the density of unobserved consumer characteristics Di and ￿i, to obtain
the unconditional choice probability Pr jt, as given by (3). We now generalize this to also
account for observed consumer heterogeneity, since we observe sales not just by model j and
22market t, but also by sex s.
The conditional choice probability that individual i of sex s in market t chooses model j







and the unconditional probability is again the integral over unobserved consumer character-




We approximate this integral by taking draws from the empirical distribution for Di and
Halton draws from the normal distribution for ￿i.
Let ￿ be the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. We can then construct the sim-










where nsjt is the number of individuals of sex s choosing model j in zip code t, or simply
the observed car sales by sex, model and zip code.
The likelihood function also contains the probabilities Pr s0t that an individual chooses
the outside good 0, i.e. take public transportation or use an old car. We therefore need a
measure of the number of consumers that choose the outside good, ns0t. This amounts to
specifying the total number of potential consumers of sex s in market t, Ist, from which we
then simply compute ns0t = Ist ￿
PJ
j=1 nsjt. Following other work on the car market, we
specify the number of potential consumers Ist as proportional to total population, POPst.
Since cars are durable goods, we assume that individuals make a purchasing decision every
seven years. Furthermore, we exclude the non-active population from the potential market.
The number of potential consumers of sex s in market t then becomes Ist = POPst=37. This
is in line with other literature, and we also performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to
other factors of proportionality, which gave similar results.
Price endogeneity Our utility speci￿cation in (1) does not only include observed car char-
acteristics xj and pj, but also characteristics unobserved to the researcher, ￿j, such as brand
image, quality, design, etc. Both consumers and manufacturers may take these unobserved
characteristics into account in their purchasing and pricing decisions. This creates a well-
known potential endogeneity problem for the price variable. We considered two approaches
to account for this.
A ￿rst approach is the control function approach of Petrin and Train (2010). In a ￿rst
23stage we perform a linear regression of prices on the observed exogenous product character-
istics xj and additional instruments zj
pj = E[pjjxj;zj] + ￿j:
Following Berry et al. (1995), Petrin and Train (2010), Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010),
the instruments zj include the sum of each exogenous characteristic across all car models of
other ￿rms and the sum of each characteristic across other car models of the same ￿rm. In
the second stage, we estimate our demand model using maximum likelihood, after replacing
￿j by ￿
￿b ￿j in the utility speci￿cation of (1), where b ￿j are the residuals from the ￿rst stage
regression, and ￿
￿ is an additional parameter to be estimated. Petrin and Train (2010)
show that the control function approach is consistent under monopoly pricing and marginal
cost pricing in a discrete choice setting. Under oligopoly pricing however, the unobservable
product product characteristic enters the pricing equation in a nonseparable manner, there-
fore b ￿j may not fully condition out the dependence of prices on the unobservable product
characteristic ￿j. Any remaining dependence may still bias the estimated price elasticity to
some extent.
An alternative approach is to immediately proceed with maximum likelihood, but include
a full set of car model ￿xed e⁄ects to control for the unobserved car characteristics ￿j. As
discussed in Nevo (2000), the mean utility parameters associated with xj and pj (￿ and ￿)
are then no longer identi￿ed, but one can follow Chamberlain (1982) and in a second stage
conduct a linear instrumental variable regression of the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects on xj and pj
(and adjust the standard errors appropriately).
We implemented both approaches in a simpli￿ed setting without random coe¢ cients and
obtained similar results (with a slightly lower absolute value for the price parameter under
the ￿xed e⁄ects approach). This suggests that in our dataset the control function method
works quite well in eliminating the bias from the endogenous price variable. Furthermore,
the maximum likelihood method with a full set of model ￿xed e⁄ects is substantially slower,
because of the large number of these ￿xed e⁄ects. Estimation would evidently become even
slower in the complete model with random coe¢ cients to account for unobserved consumer
heterogeneity.10 Since the results in the simpli￿ed setting are similar using both methods,
we estimate our rich speci￿cation based on a combination of both methods. We include a set
of dummy variables for country of origin e⁄ects, and implement a control function approach
10When estimating 225 model dummies in 2x1139 markets, we need to use matrices of dimension
225x512550. For a small subset of 2x100 markets, thus employing matrices of dimension 225x45,000, max-
imum likelihood estimation of the 225 model dummies took over 6 hours in the model without random
coe¢ cients.
24to account for remaining unobserved model characteristics.
6 Empirical results and implications for exclusive deal-
ing
We ￿rst discuss the estimated demand parameters. We then combine these parameters with
our equilibrium pricing model to perform policy counterfactuals on the e⁄ects of a move
from exclusive dealing to multi-branding.
6.1 Empirical results of demand model
Speci￿cation We considered a variety of di⁄erent speci￿cations for our spatial demand
model: with or without consumer demographics to account for observed heterogeneity (￿);
and with or without random coe¢ cients to account for unobserved heterogeneity (￿). Table
3 presents the empirical results for the complete model, including consumer demographics
and random coe¢ cients to account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity. Several tables in
Appendix shows the results of the parallel models that do not account for observed and/or
unobserved heterogeneity.
The vector of car characteristics xj consists of a constant and the variables horsepower,
length, and fuel consumption. The vector of consumer demographics Di consists of the
variables female, income, household size and urbanization. Finally, the distance vector dijt
includes both distance (in km) and distance squared, to account for a possibly declining
impact of distance on utility.
To account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity we restrict the random coe¢ cients
matrix ￿ to the diagonal elements. To account for observed consumer heterogeneity (in the
second speci￿cation), we can in principle interact all consumer demographics Di with price
pj and the other car characteristics xj through the parameter matrix ￿. Since we observe
sales by sex, it was indeed possible to interact the variable female with all car characteristics
(including the constant). For the other demographics, however, we only observe the empirical
distribution across consumers, so it was more di¢ cult to precisely estimate all interaction
parameters. We therefore interact the other demographics only with the constant and a
limited number of other car characteristics.
We ￿rst discuss the estimated mean valuations for price pj and the other car character-
istics xj (￿rst column of Table 3), and then discuss the observed and unobserved consumer
heterogeneity regarding the valuation of these characteristics (next columns). Finally, we
discuss the consumers￿valuations for distance to the nearest dealer dij.
25Table 3: Results of the random coe¢ cients logit model with observed and unob-
served consumer heterogeneity
Interactions
Means Std. Dev. with Demographics
(￿￿ s) (￿￿ s) Female Income Hh size Urbanization
Constant -1.79 2.21 -1.11 7.03 -0.42 -0.19
(0.13) (0.04) (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.00)
Price -7.27 0.05 -0.43 8.27 - -
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11)
Length 0.45 0.00 -0.35 - 0.36 -
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Fuel consumption -5.67 0.27 -0.29 - - 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
Horsepower 5.44 0.17 -1.16 - - -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
distance -0.57 0.33 -0.16 - - -
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
distance2 0.00 0.00 0.01 - - -
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
b ￿ 3.72 - - - -
(0.02)
Origin dummies yes
Note: The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the mean
e⁄ects (￿￿ s) in the ￿rst column. Column 2 shows estimates of the random coe¢ cients (￿￿ s), while
columns 3-6 show estimates of the interactions between product characteristics and consumer
demographics. Compared with the summary statistics in Table 2, the variables are scaled as
follows: horsepower/100, fuel consumption/10, length/100, distance/10 and income/100.
Mean valuations for the car characteristics Price has a signi￿cant and negative im-
pact on consumers￿mean utility. The implied average own-price elasticity across car models
is equal to -4.7. This corresponds to a mean price cost￿ margin of 30% (median of 26%),
which is broadly in line with other estimates, e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) or
Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Horsepower and length have a signi￿cantly positive impact
on mean utility. Fuel consumption (liter per 100 km) has a negative e⁄ect, meaning that
consumers on average care a lot about fuel e¢ ciency.
Note that the residual b ￿ of the ￿rst stage price regression has a signi￿cant positive
coe¢ cient, indicating that the control function method captures the endogeneity of the price
variable quite well. As expected, when we estimate the model without the control function,
26the price coe¢ cient is estimated much closer to zero, as shown in Appendix. The average
own-price elasticity also drops considerably to -1.8, compared with -4.7 when we accounted
for price endogeneity.11
Observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity There is considerable hetero-
geneity in the valuation of the car characteristics across consumers. We begin with the role
of observed consumer heterogeneity (￿). Women show a substantially di⁄erent purchasing
behavior than men. They are more sensitive to price and especially to fuel costs, and they
tend to care less about horsepower. In contrast with men, they only have a weak preference
for larger cars: the valuation parameter of length is 0.45 for men, and only 0.10 (=0.45￿
0.35) for women. This may re￿ ect the tradition of multi-car households to register the family
car under the man￿ s name. Finally, the constant suggests that women are substantially less
likely to purchase a car (and instead choose the outside good). This may capture the frequent
practice of single-car households to register their car under the men￿ s name.
As mentioned earlier, we do not have direct sales information on the other demographics,
and only observe the distribution of these demographics by zip code. We therefore consider
a more limited number of interactions for the other demographics. High income households
are more likely to buy a car, and tend to be less price sensitive. Larger households have a
stronger valuation for car size (length) and for the outside good. Urban households are less
likely to buy a car, as they have better access to public transportation. Urban households
are also slightly less concerned about fuel e¢ ciency, possibly because they tend to have a
lower annual mileage than households in rural areas.
Now consider unobserved consumer heterogeneity, as captured by the random coe¢ cients
(￿). They are precisely estimated and quantitatively important compared to the mean
valuations (￿). For example, the mean (-5.67) and standard deviation (0.27) for the valuation
of fuel consumption imply that 95% of consumers have a valuation for fuel consumption
in the interval [￿ 5.14,￿ 6.20]. It is interesting to note that the random coe¢ cients on the
constant, price and fuel consumption are signi￿cantly lower than in the model where we do
not account for observed heterogeneity (see table in Appendix). Consumer demographics
therefore capture a signi￿cant part of consumer heterogeneity. Nevertheless, there is still an
important part of unobserved heterogeneity left.
The economically most relevant random coe¢ cient turns out to be the one associated
with the constant. This parameter re￿ ects consumer heterogeneity regarding the valuation
11As discussed above, as an alternative to the control function approach, we also included a full set of
car model ￿xed e⁄ects, and estimated the price coe¢ cient and other mean utility parameters in a second
stage. This procedure gave similar results, though we only implemented it on a simpli￿ed model because it
is computationally much more complex because of the large number of car model ￿xed e⁄ects.
27of the inside goods relative to the outside good. It thus allows substitution between inside
goods to be stronger than substitution towards the outside good. Our estimates show that
the random coe¢ cient on the constant is more than twice as large as the mean, indicating
strong substitution between inside goods relative to the outside good.12 To con￿rm this
￿nding, we also estimated a nested logit model where the ￿rst nest includes all inside goods,
and the second nest includes the outside good. The nesting parameter of this model has a
similar interpretation as the standard deviation for the constant. This results in a highly
signi￿cant nesting parameter of 0.33, implying very similar results on the substitutability of
the inside goods versus the outside good (results not shown).
In sum, these ￿ndings indicate the importance of accounting for both observed and
unobserved consumer heterogeneity, in particular regarding the valuation of the outside
good. Accounting for consumer heterogeneity implies more ￿ exible substitution patterns.
The cross-price elasticities among the inside goods are on average almost three times larger
(1.3) than the cross-price elasticities between the inside goods and the outside good (0.5).13
These ￿ exible substitution patterns will be important in our counterfactuals. As we discuss
below, a simple logit without consumer heterogeneity would predict too much substitution
between inside goods and the outside good, and thus lead to unrealistic e⁄ects of introducing
multi-brand dealers.
Distance to dealers In addition to car characteristics, consumers value dealer proximity:
distance has a strong and highly signi￿cant, negative e⁄ect on consumer utility. Women value
dealer proximity even more than men. There is substantial unobserved heterogeneity, since
the standard deviations for the distance coe¢ cient is about half of the mean. Note that the
magnitudes of the estimated mean distance coe¢ cients are of a similar order of magnitude as
Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010)￿ s results for the car market in the San Diego area (in a
model that does not allow for consumer heterogeneity regarding the valuation of distance).14
The distance coe¢ cients imply that consumers are more likely to purchase a given brand
if they are closely located to the brand. This has several possible interpretations. It may
re￿ ect direct travel costs associated with the search and purchase of a new car, or a higher
brand awareness when a dealer of a particular brand is located nearby. Probably more
12Furthermore, in the model without the random coe¢ cients (see table in Appendix) most remaining
parameters remain similar. The only exception is the constant, which is much higher and thus appears to
take over the omitted random coe¢ cient on the constant.
13A ￿gure in Appendix provides more information on the distribution of the own- and cross price elastic-
ities.
14Albuquerque and Bronnenberg (2010)￿ s coe¢ cient ranges between -0.7 for the logit model and -0.2 for
the nested logit model (when transformed from 100 miles to 10km). We obtain measures between -0.4 and
-0.6 across our 4 speci￿cations.
28importantly, it may also re￿ ect travel costs for expected after-sales services, because there
are still strong links between the sales and after-sales network in the European car market
(e.g. Lademann and Partner (2001)).15
Regardless the interpretation, the strong signi￿cance of the distance coe¢ cients high-
lights the importance of a dense dealer network to establish market share. To gain further
insights in this, Table 4 computes a distance elasticity matrix. Each cell shows the predicted
percentage change of a brand￿ s market share when the distances to dealers of a given brand
are decreased by 10%. The elements on the diagonal show the e⁄ect of the change in dealer
distances on the brand￿ s own market share. We ￿nd that a brand￿ s market share would on
average increase by 2% if its dealers are 10% closer to consumers. For example, Opel would
experience a market share increase of 2.2% (or an increase by 0.2 percentage points from
9.1% to 9.3%). The o⁄-diagonal elements of the matrix represent the e⁄ects on the other
brands￿market shares when a dealer￿ s distance decreases by 10%. The table shows that
Opel would mainly gain at the expense of its competitors, rather than from attracting new
consumers (outside good). This follows from the high signi￿cance of the estimated random
coe¢ cient on the constant and will be important when we consider the policy counterfactuals
on a shift to multi-branding.
In sum, these ￿ndings on the importance of dense dealer networks are a ￿rst indication
that exclusive dealing may serve as an entry barrier. We will explore this in much more detail
in our counterfactuals in the next subsection.
Table 4: Distance elasticity matrix using full demand model
Opel Citroºn Toyota Honda Outside
good
Opel 2.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1
Citroºn -0.2 1.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Toyota 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0
Honda 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0
Note: The table reports the percentage change in market shares
for Opel, Citroºn, Toyota, Honda and the outside good (columns),
when dealers of Opel, Citroºn, Toyota and Honda are located 10%
closer to consumers (rows).
15According to Lademann and Partner (2001), a large fraction of consumers make use of maintenance and
repair services at the dealer where they purchased their car. The car manufacturers actively promote the
link between sales and after-sales services, for example through a warranty system at authorized dealers. In
recent years, the European Commission has attempted to loosen the link, but apparently with mixed success.
296.2 Incentives and e⁄ects of exclusive dealing
We use the estimated demand system and equilibrium conditions to uncover the manufac-
turers￿current marginal costs, as given by (7). We then perform policy counterfactuals to
assess the e⁄ects of a shift from exclusive dealing to multi-branding. As discussed in section
4, a shift to multi-branding can be modeled as a shift in the distance matrix from d0 to d1.
It may have direct e⁄ects on pro￿ts and welfare, and indirect e⁄ects through a change in the
equilibrium price vector de￿ned by (6).
Following our framework set out in section 3, we consider both unilateral and collec-
tive multi-branding agreements between incumbents and entrants. Our data set contains 33
brands, which we divide in 11 European incumbents and 22 entrants. The European incum-
bent mass manufacturers that we consider are large with respect to sales and density of the
dealer network. They are Opel, Citroºn, Peugeot, Renault, Volkswagen, Ford, BMW, Seat,
Fiat, Audi and Mercedes.16 The other 22 brands are Asian, Eastern European and smaller
Western European brands. In each multi-branding agreement we pair one of the 11 European
incumbents with two of the 22 entrants, so that dealers sell at most three brands. This is
consistent with the second reform of the Block Exemption Regulation￿ s between 2002-2010,
when dealers could in principle sell up to three brands (see section 2). More speci￿cally,
we pair each of the incumbents with 1 Asian and 1 non-Asian brand in decreasing order of
sales.17 We also considered numerous other possible combinations of agreements, and these
lead to similar conclusions.
For simplicity, we consider ￿one-way access￿ , i.e. the incumbents accept the entrants
on their existing network, but not vice versa. We assume that entrants keep their existing
dealerships, but results are robust with respect to this assumption. Allowing two-way access
would imply that the incumbents also obtain new dealerships: this would go against most of
the theoretical literature on exclusive dealing as an entry barrier, and is also likely to infringe
current exclusive territory agreements (since the incumbents already have many dealerships,
all with exclusive territories). We thus end up with 11 hypothetical unilateral agreements,
and one collective agreement where all 11 agreements are made simultaneously.18
We ￿rst consider the internal pro￿t incentives, and focus on comparing unilateral with
collective agreements. We subsequently consider the external e⁄ects on market shares, con-
sumer surplus and welfare, focusing only on the collective agreement.
16Opel (G.M.) and Ford are multi-national ￿rms under U.S. ownership. We treat them here as incumbents
because of their long market presence through local production facilities targeted mainly for European
markets.
17Since there are only 10 Asian brands, we do not pair Mercedes with an Asian, but instead with 2 other
luxury brands.
18Table A-6 in Appendix lists all the agreements in detail.
306.2.1 Internal pro￿t incentives
Table 5 shows the e⁄ects of hypothetical multi-branding agreements on the manufacturers￿
pro￿ts. Unilateral agreements are in the left panel, collective agreements are in the right
panel. The results are based on the demand parameters of the full model with both observed
and unobserved consumer heterogeneity.
Unilateral agreements According to Table 5, each unilateral multi-branding agreement
would substantially raise the ￿rms￿combined pro￿ts. For example, an agreement between
Opel, Toyota and Skoda lowers Opel￿ s pro￿ts by 0.7%, but substantially raises Toyota￿ s and
Skoda￿ s pro￿ts by 17%, implying a combined pro￿t increase for the three brands of 3.5%.
To explain this, recall our conceptual framework for the pro￿t incentives for exclusive
dealing in section 3. There are essentially two opposing e⁄ects of a multi-branding agreement.
On the one hand, it intensi￿es competition and thus reduces pro￿ts; this is the typical e⁄ect
stressed in the theoretical literature. But on the other hand, multi-branding raises the spatial
availability and thus steals business from competitors and the outside good. With unilateral
agreements, there is a lot of business stealing from competitors, so that the availability e⁄ect
dominates the competition e⁄ects.
Since all unilateral multi-branding agreements in Table 5 raise the ￿rms￿combined pro￿ts,
it is quite safe to conclude that there are no unilateral anti-competitive pro￿t incentives to
maintain exclusive dealing arrangements in the absence of e¢ ciencies. Hence, the pro￿t
incentives should be sought elsewhere. Perhaps there is a collective anti-competitive pro￿t
incentive. We turn to this possibility next.
Collective agreements The situation is indeed quite di⁄erent when we consider the man-
ufacturers￿collective incentives, i.e. when we compare pro￿ts assuming that all twelve man-
ufacturers simultaneously shift to multi-branding. The combined pro￿ts of each incumbent￿
entrant pair now no longer necessarily increase. There is only a strong pro￿t increase for
2 out of the 11 agreements. The other 9 multi-branding agreements are barely pro￿table,
or even induce a strong pro￿t reduction when collectively moving from exclusive dealing to
multi-branding. The total combined pro￿t e⁄ects of a collective shift from exclusive dealing
to multi-branding are negative, but small, i.e. -0.2%.
The intuition again follows from the two opposing e⁄ects of a shift to multi-branding:
the negative e⁄ect from intensi￿ed competition and the positive e⁄ect from increased spatial
availability. From the manufacturers￿collective perspective, the availability e⁄ect is much
less important. Since all ￿rms are now in multi-branding agreements, there is only potential
business stealing from the outside good. But this business stealing from the outside good
31Table 5: Internal pro￿t incentives for exclusive dealing (in emil.) using full demand
model
(1) (2) (3)
Current Unilateral agreement Collective agreement
pro￿t % ￿ % ￿ % ￿ % ￿ % ￿ % ￿
(e mil.) Incumb. Other 2 Both Incumb. Other 2 Both
Opel & 2 217 -0.7 17.0 3.5 -7.1 9.1 -3.2
Citroºn & 2 268 -0.7 18.8 2.8 -7.1 10.8 -3.9
Peugeot & 2 180 -1.2 30.1 6.9 -7.0 22.0 0.4
Renault & 2 200 -0.8 19.2 4.1 -7.4 11.2 -2.8
VW & 2 145 -0.9 24.5 6.2 -7.2 16.5 -0.6
Ford & 2 137 -1.3 68.1 8.8 -7.3 57.7 2.2
BMW & 2 39 -0.2 14.1 5.5 -6.9 6.2 -1.7
Seat & 2 81 -1.9 44.6 26.1 -7.0 37.1 19.6
Fiat & 2 43 -0.7 34.8 16.2 -7.0 26.0 8.7
Audi & 2 45 -0.3 66.7 6.9 -7.2 54.9 -0.5
Mercedes & 2 24 0.0 53.0 1.8 -6.8 42.6 -5.1
Total 1,378 -0.9 28.8 6.6 -7.1 20.6 -0.2
Note: The table reports for each of the 11 agreements between 1 incumbent and 2 entrants: (1) the
current joint pro￿t of the 3 parties; (2) the percentage change in pro￿ts made by the incumbent and
2 entrants in a unilateral agreement; (3) and the percentage change in pro￿ts when all agreements
are made collectively. Precise de￿nitions of the agreements are provided in the.
turns out to be fairly limited, since our demand model showed that consumers tend to view
the inside goods as quite close substitutes relative to the outside good (strong observed and
unobserved heterogeneity regarding the constant).19
In sum, these counterfactuals show that the car manufacturers do not have unilateral
anti-competitive incentives to engage in exclusive dealing absent e¢ ciencies, since they would
lose too much sales to competitors and limit competition only to a limited degree. However,
from a collective perspective, manufacturers can have anti-competitive pro￿t incentives for
exclusive dealing (even absent e¢ ciencies), since they only lose sales relative to the outside
good and can restrict competition more substantially.
19This is di⁄erent in our simpli￿ed logit model where we do not account for consumer heterogeneity, as
reported in the Appendix. In this case, there is much more substitution from the outside good so that even
collective multi-branding is quite pro￿table.
326.2.2 External e⁄ects of exclusive dealing on the market
We can now consider the external e⁄ects of exclusive dealing. Given that ￿rms do not
have a unilateral, but possibly a collective anti-competitive incentive, we limit attention to
the external e⁄ects from a collective multi-branding agreement. More speci￿cally, Table 6
shows the e⁄ects of a collective multi-branding agreement (or a ban on exclusive dealing) on
market shares, total pro￿ts, consumer surplus and total welfare. To gain economic intuition,
we present a decomposition into the direct availability e⁄ect of multi-branding, holding prices
constant, and the indirect competition e⁄ects, through changes in the equilibrium prices (as
discussed in section 4).
Market shares would shift from the European incumbents in favor of the entrants after
a collective ban on exclusive dealing. The European incumbents would loose 5.3 percentage
points of market share, and the entrants would gain the same amount when they can access
the incumbents￿dealer networks. Holding prices constant, the European incumbents would
loose 5.5% points of market share, because the Asian entrants are now located closer to
consumers. But the incumbents gain back 0.2 percentage points as a result of the changed
prices. Intuitively, multi-branding intensi￿es price competition, and especially by the incum-
bents whose market power has decreased. Similarly, the market share gain of the entrants is
largely due to their increased distribution network and slightly reduced by the price e⁄ect.
Consumers would gain from a collective ban on exclusive dealing. Consumer surplus will
rise by e3.8 billion. This amounts to e867 per household, which is a sizeable fraction of
the average price of a sold car. The biggest part of this increase (e781 per household) is
due to increased spatial availability: the larger number of dealerships means that consumers
incur lower travel costs associated with sales and after-sales services. A smaller part of
the consumer surplus increase (e87 per household) is due to the reduced prices stemming
from the increased competition after a ban on exclusive dealing. On balance, most of the
consumer gains from multi-branding are due to increased spatial availability (90%), and
only a small part is due to increased competition (10%). Industry pro￿ts do not change that
much, so that the total welfare increase from multi-branding largely coincides with the gains
to consumers (+e3.8 billion).
6.2.3 Summary
We can summarize these ￿ndings as follows. Absent e¢ ciency considerations, a ban on
exclusive dealing would have a quite substantial positive e⁄ect on consumer surplus and
total welfare. The consumer gains of about e3.8 billion or e867 per household are for 90%
due to increased spatial availability of brands, and only for 10% due to the bene￿ts from
33Table 6: Welfare e⁄ects of a ban on exclusive dealing using full demand model
Current Total change Change at ct prices Change due to prices
Market shares (%)
Outside good 24% -0.8 -0.7 -0.1
Inside goods 76% +0.8 +0.7 +0.1
Incumbents 73% -5.3 -5.5 +0.2
Entrants 27% +5.3 +5.5 -0.2
Total 100% +0.0 +0.0 +0.0
Pro￿ts (e million)
Incumbents 1,031 -74 -69 -5
Entrants 346 +71 +74 -3
Total 1,378 -3 5 -8
Consumer surplus (e million)
Total +3817 +3436 +381
Per hh (euro) +867 +781 +87
Welfare (e million)
Total +3814 +3441 +373
Note: The table reports the e⁄ects of a collective shift to multi-branding on the market shares, pro￿ts,
consumer surplus and total welfare. The e⁄ects are split into a change at constant prices (only spatial
availability e⁄ect) and a change due to changed prices
increased price competition. Firms clearly have no unilateral incentives for maintaining
exclusive dealing, but they can have collective incentives to adopt exclusive dealing, even in
the absence of e¢ ciencies. In sum, the current distribution system, where ￿rms collectively
maintain exclusive dealing, does not necessarily have an e¢ ciency rationale (such as the
provision of services) and can imply large losses to consumers and welfare.
7 Extensions
To gain further intuition on the incentives and e⁄ects of exclusive dealing we now consider
several extensions of the base model of section 6. First, we ask how the results change under
alternative demand speci￿cations, in particular if consumers cannot substitute to the outside
good. Second, we ask what happens when a multi-branding agreement operates as a common
agency mechanism to raise prices of the ￿rms in the agreement (as in a merger).
347.1 The role of the outside good in alternative demand models
According to our base model, ￿rms have a strong unilateral incentive to make multi-branding
agreements, but they can have a collective incentive to maintain exclusive dealing. Intu-
itively, multi-branding does not only intensify price competition, but it also raises demand
because of increased spatial availability. With a unilateral multi-branding agreement the
demand e⁄ect is large because there is business stealing from both the competitors and
from the outside good. With a collective multi-branding agreement the demand e⁄ect is
much lower, since there is only business stealing from the outside good. Hence, a collective
multi-branding agreement may not be pro￿table, if substitution to the outside good is small
relative to the intensi￿ed price competition.
This discussion shows that the substitution possibilities towards the outside good are
central to understand the collective incentives for exclusive dealing that we estimated. This
is why we speci￿ed a rich demand model, and in particular allowed for both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity regarding the valuation of the outside good (the intercept). Never-
theless, it is still possible that the demand model overestimates substitution from the outside
good after a multi-branding agreement. If so, then the pro￿t gains from multi-branding would
be overestimated. In this section we therefore ask how do the results change (i) when spec-
ifying simpli￿ed models with less heterogeneity regarding the outside good valuation, and
(ii) when specifying a model where consumers cannot substitute to the outside good (and
hence can only substitute to other ￿rms).
Table 7 shows a summary of the results from this sensitivity analysis. The ￿rst four rows
address the ￿rst question. They show how a collective multi-brand agreement a⁄ects the
share of the outside good, pro￿ts and consumer surplus under four demand speci￿cations:
the simple logit without consumer heterogeneity (￿ = ￿ = 0), the logit with only observed
heterogeneity through the demographic variables (￿ only), the logit with only unobserved
heterogeneity through the random coe¢ cients (￿ only) and the logit with both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity (both ￿ and ￿, our base model above).20 Both simple logit
and the logit with only observed heterogeneity overestimate substitution from the outside
good after a multi-brand agreement. Hence, these models ￿nd that multi-branding increases
total pro￿ts, hence no collective incentive for exclusive dealing. In contrast, the logit with
unobserved heterogeneity implies limited substitution from the outside good. As a result,
this model predicts that multi-branding reduces total pro￿ts, or a collective incentive for
exclusive dealing (even higher than in the base model with both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity).
20The Appendix presents more complete results (demand parameters and counterfactuals) for these models,
as well as for the model without an outside good discussed further below.
35The last row shows the results from an alternative demand model with both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity, but without substitution possibilities towards the outside good.
This model thus assumes that consumers always buy one car, regardless of prices or spatial
availability, in line with assumptions in some theoretical work, e.g. Besanko and Perry
(1994). By construction, in this model multi-branding attracts no demand from the outside
good. This in turn implies that the multi-branding agreement now reduces pro￿ts by a larger
amount: by -1.4% as compared with -0.2% in the base model where we allowed substitution to
the outside good. Hence, if we abstract from substitution to the outside good, the collective
incentives for exclusive dealing become stronger, but they are not overwhelming. The reason
is that multi-branding on the one hand does not attract demand from the outside good (by
construction), but on the other hand it also does not intensify competition by that much (as
shown in Appendix where we present the welfare e⁄ects including the price e⁄ects).
Table 7: Summary of pro￿t incentives and external e⁄ects under alternative demand
models
Demand ￿s0 ￿￿ ￿CS
(% points) (mill. e) (%) (e / hh)
simple logit (￿ = ￿ = 0) -1.1 +11 +0.8 +641
logit + ￿ -1.2 +9 +0.7 +774
logit + ￿ -0.4 -7 -0.5 +740
logit + ￿ + ￿ -0.8 -3 -0.2 +867
logit + ￿ + ￿; no outside good 0 -25 -1.4 +1105
Note: The table reports the e⁄ects of a collective shift to multi-branding on the market share of the
outside good (￿s0), total pro￿ts (￿￿) and consumer surplus (￿CS). Results are for four alternative
demand models: logit without heterogeneity (￿ = ￿ = 0), with only observed heterogeneity (￿), with
only unobserved heterogeneity (￿), with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity (the full model),
and the full model but assuming there is no outside good.
7.2 Change in price-setting behavior
Our base model assumed that multi-brand agreements do not in￿ uence pricing behavior:
￿rms continue to behave as multi-product price-setting ￿rms, accounting for other products
of the ￿rm, but competing with products from rival ￿rms. However, Bernheim and Whinston
(1998) showed that two competing upstream ￿rms may alter their behavior when they sell
their products through a common agent (i.e. a multi-brand dealer): they can use the common
agent to coordinate on the monopoly outcome. Rey and VergØ (2010) extend this framework
to have interlocking relationships between two upstream ￿rms and two downstream retailers.
36Under RPM, there are multiple equilibria for wholesale and retail price schedules. In one
equilibrium, retail prices are the Bertrand prices (and wholesale prices are such that variable
retail margins are zero). This was the equilibrium we considered in our base model, and for
which Bonnet and Dubois (2010) found empirical support in another context. In another
equilibrium, retail prices are equal to the joint-pro￿t maximizing monopoly prices (and
wholesale prices are equal to marginal costs). This equilibrium is similar to Bernheim and
Whinston￿ s common agency model with one retailer.
In the spirit of this common agency literature, we modify our base model and assume
that ￿rms in a multi-brand agreement set retail prices to maximize their joint pro￿ts. These
are not the monopoly prices as in the above papers, since we do not consider a single
common agent selling all products. Instead, these are the prices of multi-product price-
setting ￿rms taking into account the products of all brands in the multi-brand agreement,
both the ones already owned before the agreement and the ones that they gain in the multi-
brand agreement. Hence, we consider multi-brand agreements that are equivalent to a full
merger between the ￿rms in the considered multi-brand agreement. For example, a multi-
brand agreement between Opel and Toyota does not only imply that Toyota gets access on
Opel￿ s network (as in the base model), but also that Opel and Toyota set their prices as
a single ￿rm. Concretely, as in section 5 we still assume that multi-branding changes the
distance matrix from d0 to d1, but we now also assume that multi-branding changes the
￿rms￿ownership matrix as in a merger simulation.
Table 8 shows the pro￿t incentives of a collective shift to multi-branding (parallel to
the right panel of Table 5). All agreements now become pro￿table, because multi-branding
eliminates competition between the involved ￿rms. As a result, total pro￿ts of all ￿rms would
increase by 6.3% after a collective shift to multi-branding (as opposed to a drop by -0.2%
if multi-branding would not eliminate competition). In sum, if multi-branding induces the
involved ￿rms to coordinate their pricing decisions, it becomes very di¢ cult to rationalize
exclusive dealing, even from a collective perspective: large e¢ ciencies are required.
Table 9 shows the external e⁄ects of a collective shift to multi-branding when ￿rms in the
agreement set prices cooperatively. The changes at constant prices evidently remain the same
as in the base model, shown in Table 6. The di⁄erences stem from the new, more cooperative
price equilibrium assumed here. First, the shift in market share from the incumbents to the
entrants becomes much smaller (-3.4% instead of -5.3% in the base model). This is because
under coordinated pricing the entrants raise their prices by more than the incumbents,
allowing the latter to gain back part of the lost market share after opening access to their
dealership network. Second, the increase in pro￿ts under multi-branding mainly comes from
the higher prices (+e80 million), and only slightly comes from the higher demand due




pro￿t % ￿ % ￿ % ￿
(e mil.) Incumb. Other 2 Both
Opel & 2 217 -0.4 17.0 3.8
Citroºn & 2 268 -1.8 14.8 1.1
Peugeot & 2 180 -1.8 25.8 5.3
Renault & 2 200 -0.5 18.9 4.4
VW & 2 145 -1.1 23.1 5.7
Ford & 2 137 -0.1 69.4 10.0
BMW & 2 39 0.6 14.8 6.2
Seat & 2 81 -0.9 45.0 26.7
Fiat & 2 43 0.3 36.0 17.3
Audi & 2 45 -1.0 63.8 5.9
Mercedes & 2 24 0.8 55.1 2.6
Total 1,378 -0.9 27.6 6.3
Note: The table reports for each of the 11 agreements between 1 incumbent and 2 entrants under
Common Agency: (1) the current joint pro￿t of the 3 parties; (2) the percentage change in pro￿ts
made by the incumbent and 2 entrants in a unilateral agreement; (3) and the percentage change
in pro￿ts when all agreements take place simultaneously.
to increased spatial availability (+e6 million). Third, while we found large consumer gains
from a collective shift to multi-branding (+e867 per household), consumers are now actually
hurt, albeit by a small amount (-e22 per household): the gains from increased spatial variety
(+e781) are more than outweighed by the losses from the increased prices (-e803).
To summarize, if multi-branding would result in an equilibrium where the involved ￿rms
coordinate their pricing decisions, ￿rms have a strong pro￿t incentive to shift to multi-
branding, while consumers are essentially una⁄ected (since their gains from more availability
are compensated by their losses from higher prices. Since ￿rms in practice apparently prefer
exclusive dealing over multi-branding, this means that there must be large e¢ ciency gains
so that a ban on exclusive dealing would likely harm welfare under this scenario.
38Table 9: Welfare e⁄ects of a ban on exclusive dealing under change in price-setting behavior
Current Total change Change at ct prices Change due to prices
Market shares (%)
Outside good 24% 0.0 -0.7 0.7
Inside goods 76% +0.0 +0.7 -0.7
Incumbents 73% -3.4 -5.5 2.1
Entrants 27% +3.4 +5.5 -2.1
Total 100% +0.0 +0.0 0.0
Pro￿ts (e million)
Incumbents 1,031 -9 -68 59
Entrants 346 +95 +74 21
Total 1,378 86 6 80
Consumer surplus (e million)
Total -95 +3436 -3531
Per hh (euro) -22 +781 -803
Welfare (e million)
Total -9 +3442 -3451
Note: The table reports the e⁄ects of a shift to multi-branding on the market shares, pro￿ts, consumer
surplus and total welfare under Common Agency, ignoring e¢ ciency gains. The e⁄ects are split into a
change at constant prices (only spatial availability e⁄ect) and a change due to changed prices
8 Conclusion
Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up
their own dealer networks to enter the market. If consumers care a lot about dealer proximity,
then new entrants must set up dense networks to enter the market and obtain critical mass.
Exclusive dealing may then act as a barrier to entry and foreclose new competitors. We
develop a framework to understand the internal pro￿t incentives and external e⁄ects of
exclusive dealing, and apply it to the European car market. The empirical results from our
demand model show, among other things, that consumers indeed put a high value on dealer
proximity, presumably because of strong links with after-sales services. Counterfactuals
show that manufacturers have a strong unilateral incentive to shift from exclusive dealing to
multi-branding. However, the industry as a whole can have a collective incentive to maintain
exclusive dealing, even in the absence of e¢ ciencies. A ban on exclusive dealing would shift
market shares from the larger European ￿rms to the smaller entrants. But more importantly,
consumers would gain substantially, mainly because of the increased spatial availability and
less so because of intensi￿ed price competition. Our ￿ndings suggest that the European
39Commission￿ s recent decision to facilitate exclusive dealing in the car market may not have
been warranted.
Our analysis is based on a number of assumptions that may be generalized in future
research. First, as in most of the car market literature we assumed a standard pricing equi-
librium, where it is as if the upstream and downstream ￿rm are vertically integrated. This
equilibrium is consistent with the various price- and non-price restraints in the car market,
and with some empirical evidence in another context (Bonnet and Dubois (2010)). Further
work could consider other pricing equilibria, but this would best require additional data such
as wholesale prices or information on sales targets and bonuses at the dealer level, which is
di¢ cult to obtain for the car market.
Second, we considered simple policy counterfactuals, where alternative manufacturers
shift from exclusive dealing to multi-branding. An extensive sensitivity analysis con￿rmed
that the results remain similar for other collective multi-branding agreements. It would be
interesting to endogenize the entry decisions to uncover ￿xed entry costs and compute new
equilibria after a ban on exclusive dealing. Estimating such a model implies important new
challenges: it does not only require modeling both the manufacturers￿decisions to allow
more retailers on their networks (taking account of territorial exclusivity), it also involves
modeling the retailers￿decisions to enter and accept exclusive dealing, for which there is
no uni￿ed theory yet as we reviewed in the introduction.21 Also, computing a new entry
equilibrium after a ban on exclusive dealing is challenging, not only because of the great
number of possible dealer locations, but also since the equilibrium depends on the speci￿c
assumptions and is not necessarily unique. These questions are nevertheless interesting to
explore in future research.
21This would follow an emerging literature on estimating ￿xed costs from models of demand and entry. In
a simpli￿ed setting, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) estimate a demand model together with a free entry model,
while Ferrari et al. (2010) estimate a demand model simultaneously with a monopoly model with restricted
entry. Ishii (2008) is an example of a more complicated model of spatial demand and entry, following Pakes
et al.￿ s (2011) moment inequalities approach.
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44Appendix
Table A-1: Results of the logit model without consumer heterogeneity and without control-
ling for price endogeneity
Interactions
Means Std. Dev. with Demographics
















Note: The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the mean e⁄ects
(￿￿ s) in the ￿rst column, when we do not control for endogeneity in price. We ￿nd estimates for
price and horsepower that are much closer to zero compared to the estimates including the control
function approach in the next table. Column 2-6 are empty since we don￿ t account for any observed
or unobserved heterogeneity among consumers in the simple logit speci￿cation.Table A-2: Results of the logit model without consumer heterogeneity
Interactions
Means Std. Dev. with Demographics


















Note: The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the mean
e⁄ects (￿￿ s) in the ￿rst column. Column 2-6 are empty since we don￿ t account for any observed or
unobserved heterogeneity among consumers in the simple logit speci￿cation.Table A-3: Results of the logit model with only observed consumer heterogeneity
Interactions
Means Std. Dev. with Demographics
(￿￿ s) (￿￿ s) Female Income Hh size Urbanization
Constant -1.05 0.77 5.7608 -1.56 -0.13
(0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00)
Price -6.52 -0.44 3.94
(0.04) (0.03) (0.11)
Length 0.02 -0.58 0.56
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)











Note: The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the mean
e⁄ects (￿￿ s) in the ￿rst column. Columns 3-6 show estimates of the interactions between prod-
uct characteristics and consumer demographics. Column 2 is empty since we don￿ t account for
unobserved heterogeneity among consumers in this simpli￿ed model.Table A-4: Results of the random coe¢ cients logit model with only unobserved consumer
heterogeneity
Interactions
Means Std. Dev. with Demographics


















Note: The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of the mean e⁄ects
(￿￿ s) in the ￿rst column. Column 2 shows estimates of the random coe¢ cients (￿￿ s). Columns
3-6 are empty since we don￿ t account for observable consumer heterogeneity through consumer
demographics in this simpli￿ed model.Table A-5: Results of the full random coe¢ cients logit model when excluding the
outside good
Interactions
Means Std. Dev. with Demographics
(￿￿ s) (￿￿ s) Sex Income Hh size Urbanization
Price -7.65 0.12 -0.19 7.98
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.11)
Length 0.88 0.00 -0.42 0.23
(0.03) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01)
Fuel consumption -5.49 2.18 -0.27 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00)









Note: The table shows parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), when excluding
the outside good, of the mean e⁄ects (￿￿ s) in the ￿rst column. Column 2 shows estimates of the
random coe¢ cients (￿￿ s), while columns 3-6 show estimates of the interactions between product
characteristics and consumer demographics.Table A-6: List of agreements used in counterfactual simula-
tions of multibranding
Incumbent Entrant 1 Entrant 2
(European) (Asian) (non-Asian)
Agreement 1 Opel Toyota Skoda
Agreement 2 Citroºn Nissan Volvo
Agreement 3 Peugeot Hyundai Alfa Romeo
Agreement 4 Renault Mazda Saab
Agreement 5 Volkswagen Suzuki Lancia
Agreement 6 Ford Honda Rover
Agreement 7 BMW Mitsubishi Land Rover
Agreement 8 Seat Kia Smart
Agreement 9 Fiat Daihatsu MG
Agreement 10 Audi Subaru Jeep
Agreement 11 Mercedes* Jaguar Porsche
Note: The table reports the 11 multi-branding agreements used in the
counterfactual simulations. Each European incumbent is paired with 1
Asian entrant and 1 non-Asian entrant in a decreasing order of sales.
Since there are only 10 Asian brands, we do not pair Mercedes with an
Asian, but instead pair it with 2 other luxury brands.Table A-7: Internal pro￿t incentives for exclusive dealing (in emil.), when there is
no substitution to the outside good
(1) (2)
Current Collective agreement
pro￿t % ￿ % ￿ % ￿
(e mil.) Incumb. Other 2 Both
Opel & 2 271 -8.4 8.1 -4.5
Citroen & 2 347 -8.2 9.8 -5.3
Peugot & 2 222 -8.2 20.7 -0.8
Renault & 2 250 -8.7 10.2 -4.1
VW & 2 178 -8.5 15.4 -1.7
Ford & 2 172 -8.6 56.6 0.2
BMW & 2 44 -8.1 5.7 -2.4
Seat & 2 104 -8.2 36.4 19.1
Fiat & 2 54 -8.4 26.0 7.4
Audi & 2 53 -8.4 55.9 -1.2
Mercedes & 2 26 -8.0 44.1 -6.1
Total 1,694 -8.4 19.7 -1.4
Note: The table reports for each of the 11 agreements between 1 incumbent and 2 entrants, when
keeping the outside good constant: (1) the current joint pro￿t of the 3 parties; (2) the percentage
change in pro￿ts when all agreements are made collectively.Table A-8: Welfare e⁄ects of a ban on exclusive dealing, when there is no substitution to
the outside good
Current Total change Change at cte prices Change due to prices
Market shares (%)
Outside good 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0
Inside goods 100% +0.0 +0.0 0.0
Incumbents 73% -5.3 -5.6 0.3
Entrants 27% +5.3 +5.6 -0.3
Total 100% +0.0 +0.0 0.0
Incumbents 1,294.7 -109 -100 -9
Entrants 425.5 +84 +89 -5
Total 1,720.2 -25 -11 -14
Total +4864 +4288 +576
Per hh (euro) +442 +390 +52
Total +4839 +4277 +562
Note: The table reports the e⁄ects of a shift to multi-branding on the market shares, pro￿ts, consumer
surplus and total welfare, when keeping the outside good constant. The e⁄ects are split into a change at
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Figure A-1: Price elasticities and margins in the random coe¢ cients logit model with demo-
graphics 
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